Assad’s Northwestern Syria Offensive 2020, Idlib’s Dawn Against Spring’s Shield

Shayan Fallahi, September 2023

Introduction

This post was written before the unexpected collapse of the Syrian Arab Republic in late 2024. It explains how the conflict developed prior to those events.

On December 19, 2019, the Syrian government embarked on one of the most significant military operations of the Syrian civil war. Labelled “Operation Dawn of Idlib 2”, the offensive sought to reclaim the strategic M5 highway linking Aleppo to Damascus and potentially to capture Idlib, the final rebel stronghold in Northern Syria. Alarmed by the initial triumphs of this operation, Turkey responded decisively, launching an armed incursion into Syria to thwart Assad and his Russo-Iranian allies from claiming a conclusive victory. The ensuing conflict was ferocious, with Syrian-Russian and Iranian forces clashing against the Turkish military, a NATO formation with exceptional firepower alongside its rebel partners. Ultimately, the confrontations resulted in a stalemate, ushering in a level of stability unprecedented for post-Arab Spring Syria.

This battle validates further study due to its complexity, scale, and lasting repercussions. It involved several states fighting directly on the ground but simultaneously cooperating in the international sphere due to concurrent events in global politics. The complexity on the ground was almost comedic. For example, Kurdish rebels known as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fought against the pro-Turkish rebels of the Syrian National Army forces, previously known as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), for the Assad regime. Russian and Iranian forces often blamed their own military attacks on Assad’s forces when they caused Turkish casualties. Turkey accepted these claims despite knowing they were untrue to avoid hampering relations outside of Syria with Russia and Iran, even though they were killing each other’s soldiers.

This paper cannot do justice to the complexity and scale of the battle as it lacks critical information, such as the political wranglings between the pro-Assad factions and their genuine objectives. It also lacks reliable insights on battlefield statistics and the makeup of the different factions involved. Nevertheless, it will explain the situation as best as possible, hoping the clash will be studied further in future.

Prelude.

By late 2019, the Syrian government had effectively retaken the entirety of the state outside the country’s northern provinces. This was an impressive turnaround for the Assad regime, whose demise had seemed inevitable in 2013/14. This was no stroke of luck. Iran provided incessant military and economic support to Assad since 2011.[1] Russia’s entrance into the war in 2015 enabled Assad to go on the offensive. Tehran would provide boots on the ground, alongside the Syrian army, with its Shia militia proxies, while Russian airstrikes and heavy weapons would provide crucial fire support for these offensives.

This was to the dismay of Turkey, who had been deeply hostile to the Assad government since the start of the war and had invested heavily in anti-Assad factions.[2] The war, however, had gone against Ankara.

 Millions of Syrians displaced by the fighting fled to Turkey, adding to the growing strains on its economy. Moreover, Turkey’s ongoing antagonism towards Syrian Kurdish rebels led Turkish Kurds, who made up a fifth of Turkey’s population, to riot. These riots escalated into an armed uprising in 2015 and 2016, which Ankara crushed.[3] Accordingly, the Kurdish groups in northern Syria who rebelled against Assad, often known as the SDF, proved equally hostile to Turkey. Turkey’s military launched three major operations against Kurdish groups in northern Syria as a result. These were “Operation Euphrates Shield” in 2017, which seized parts of northwestern Syria and the town of Al-Bab from ISIS and Kurdish groups; “Operation Oliver branch” in 2018, which seized the Kurdish-occupied town of Afrin and surrounding areas in northwestern Syria, and “Operation Peace Spring” in October 2019 which seized another large portion of Kurdish-controlled northern Syria. This last operation was particularly audacious, leaving Turkey in control of a significant portion of northern Syria. Ankara had pushed US forces to abandon their Kurdish allies in the process, prompting the Kurds to ask Assad’s forces to enter their territory to help defend it against future Turkish incursions, leaving the SDF as Assad’s de facto ally. [4]

After securing the country’s southern areas from rebel groups and now being re-admitted into its northeastern provinces by the SDF, the Syrian government seemed ready to finish the war by eliminating the final non-Turkish-occupied rebel-held area, Idlib.

Though Turkey did not directly occupy Idlib, it was on Turkey’s border and was situated west of the Afrin areas it had previously seized. It also contained Turkish forces in “observation posts”. Consequently, the idea that Turkey would not launch an armed intervention to prevent its fall was somewhat optimistic, considering they had launched “Operation Peace Spring” just two months prior.

It is also important to note Turkey’s extensive advantage in conventional military power over the Syrian government and its allies. If sufficiently determined, Turkey could destroy Syrian government forces across the country’s north. Consequently, Syria and its allies were taking a gamble by attacking Idlib directly. They must have hoped the international volatility occurring concurrently with these events, which will be explained later, would be sufficient to prevent Turkey from reacting too forcefully to its ally’s demise.

Order of Battle

The primary armed group defending Idlib by late 2019 was the Islamist Militia Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), a Jihadi group linked with Al Qaeda. These forces had mostly cleared Idlib of more moderate rebel groups in the previous years. Several pro-Turkish rebel forces supported them increasingly throughout the coming battle, including units from the Syrian National Army (SNA).[5] The Turkish military would also provide HTS and SNA with increasing direct support as the military situation deteriorated in Idlib, which would eventually number around 9,000 personnel. [6]

The US Department of Defence suggested that Turkish-backed rebel forces were between 22,000 and 50,000 men in February 2020.[7]

Syrian government forces are more challenging to estimate. A report by the Middle East Institute stated that in 2019, Syrian Arab Army (SAA) units in northern Syria numbered four special forces regiments, three infantry brigades, one mechanised brigade, one tank brigade and most of the 5^th Corp. Using the statistics, they provide; this comes to a force of between 28,500 and 37,500 men.[8] Iranian militias would heavily support the Syrian army throughout the battle. Their numbers are also unclear, but Turkey claimed 2,000 were present around one town on March 2 alone, so the total number deployed was likely significantly higher. Given their significant impact in the battle, this essay will roughly guess it to be between 5,000 and 10,000. Accordingly, this essay estimates that combined allied and government forces fielded between 33,500 and 47,500 men.

The M5 highway dominated the battle. This road ran straight north and was around 10 miles west of Idlib, providing the rebels with a defence line anchored on the two major towns on the road, Ma’arat Al-Nu’man in the south and Saeqeb further north. The road was strategically vital for the Syrian government, connecting Syria’s capital, Damascus, with Aleppo, Syria’s largest northern city. Retaking it would seriously enhance Aleppo’s security and allow economic activity to return between the urban centres, boosting Assad’s efforts to re-secure and rebuild Syria. The hills of the Aleppo provinces further north overlooked the battlefield, and the fighting there would also be important as rebel positions in the area still threatened government control of Aleppo.

Opening shots

On December 19th, government forces announced the continuation of “Operation Idlib Dawn” an operation earlier in the year to retake parts of Idlib from the rebels. For the next three days, the Syrian armies “5^th Corp” and “25^th Special Mission Forces Division” advanced northwest toward the town of Ma’arat Al-Nu’man, taking 15 towns and villages. By December 23^rd, they had achieved significant success by taking the city of Jarjanaz, a major obstacle on the way to Ma’arat Al-Nu’man. They had also encircled a Turkish observation post in the process.

Syria’s main offensive

On January 15^th, two weeks later, the Syrian army resumed its offensive operation. This new offensive moved towards the city of Saeqeb, a few miles north of its previous attacks. By January 16^th, they had seized three important tows east of Saeqeb, including Talkhatra. Rebel forces again counterattacked to reverse these advances but mostly failed.

On January 24th, Syrian government forces restarted their push towards Ma’arat Al-Nu’man. These attacks were much more forceful, and by January 26th, they had seized eight further towns, including Talmenas, the last town east of Ma’arat Al-Nu’man, and taken parts of the M5 highway north of the city, partially surrounding it. This offensive had been backed up by 72 Russian airstrikes and 52 Syrian-barrel bomb attacks, according to the SOHR,[9] demonstrating the firepower Syrian forces were now projecting.

On January 27^th, Syrian forces had almost encircled Ma’arat Al-Nu’man and were expanding their control on the areas around the town, encircling another Turkish observation post and taking local sections of the M5 highway. They stormed Ma’arat Al-Nu’man the next day after most rebel forces retreated to escape encirclement.[10] Both sides suffered around 150 dead in the clash.[11] This operation was a significant victory for the SAA, which seized a strategically important town and cracked open the rebel defence lines in only three days of fighting.

Since January 25^th, government forces had also been attacking rebel positions in the hills further north in the Aleppo province. By January 29^th, they had also achieved a significant breakthrough, pushing back rebel forces across the Aleppo area.

The capture of Ma’arat Al-Nu’man on January 24 opened the M5 road to government forces, who moved north rapidly, reaching Saeqeb from the south five days later. Government forces were also making smaller gains across the Idlib frontline. Russian airpower contributed heavily to the success of these attacks and conducted 200 airstrikes between the 29^th and 31^st.

On February 1, Turkey began reacting to this alarming rate of government success. They established three new observation posts around Saraqib, hoping to deter further government attacks on the town. That day, 4 Russian FSB officers were reportedly killed in the Aleppo frontline.[12] Numerous Iranian-affiliated militias and IRGC officers had also been killed in the fighting, demonstrating that Iranian and Russian support had reached the frontlines in some capacity.

On February 3, Turkish forces began engaging Syrian troops in limited skirmishes across the front, leaving several Turkish and Syrian soldiers dead. The same day, the Turkish air force conducted strikes on Syrian positions around Saraqib. Syria’s’ offensive continued regardless and had, by February 5, expanded its control north of the town, taking 20 villages in the vicinity, partially encircling Saeqeb itself.[13] On the 6^th, they finalised the city’s encirclement and commenced storming it, completing its capture two days later. Syrian units had also pushed further west, capturing Nayrab and reaching the outskirts of Sarmin, placing government forces just five miles from Idlib. However, the increasing Turkish military presence before Idlib deterred further Syrian advances.

The following day, the Syrian army continued their offensive north, moving along the M5 highway and seizing several villages. They also crossed the highway and pushed west, capturing the town of Kafir Halab on February tenth. Kafir Halab was just 15 miles east of the strategically vital Bab Al Hawa Turkish Syrian border crossing, which acted as Idlib’s main supply line from Turkey. Even more alarmingly, Syrian positions were only 8 miles from the road connecting Idlib to the crossing. These advances, along with the deaths of at least 6 Turkish soldiers in government artillery and airstrikes, further agitated Erdogan, who proclaimed on the 12^th that “we will strike regime forces everywhere from now on regardless of the deal if any tiny bit of harm is dealt to our soldiers at observation posts or elsewhere”. Turkey, at this stage, had amassed around 9,000 soldiers within Idlib province and had placed a further 50,000 on the border with Syria.[14]

This build-up of forces again deterred further Syrian advances westward. However, by this point, the Syrian military had already achieved a major strategic success by finalising its control of the M5 highway. It also continued advancing northward, assaulting the remaining rebel positions in Aleppo province. They attacked from the south, with the forces pushing north after securing Saeqeb, and east, with military units attacking from Aleppo. By the 16^th, these units had achieved a major breakthrough, and rebel forces were retreating from the entire area. These victories were such that on the 17^th, President Assad, in a televised speech, disregarded Turkish threats of intervention and stated that he had “rubbed their noses in the dirt as a prelude for complete victory”, to which Erdogan responded by announcing that a Turkish counter-offensive was only a “matter of time.”

Turkeys Intervention.

Erdogan was not exaggerating. Turkey’s counter-offensive began on February 20^th by providing rebel forces with heavy artillery and aerial support to retake Al Nayrab. Turkey initially aimed to push Syrian forces back from Idlib’s vicinity and retake parts of the M5 highway to protect Idlib and deny Assad his strategic victory. Turkish ground forces also took part in this attack directly.[15] Turkish and rebel forces seized Nayrab briefly before being repelled by a government counterattack backed by heavy Russian airstrikes.[16] Turkish forces, which were technically part of NATO, were now conflicting with Russia directly.

Further south on Idlib’s southern frontline, the Syrian army and its allies continued to make minor advances despite coming up against Turkish forces. Turkish and rebel forces sustained casualties and, by the 24^th, continued to retreat.

However, the tide of war was turning against the Syrian government. Also, on the 24^th, another Turkish/Rebel attack on Nayrab successfully took the town after intense fighting. They immediately continued their advance eastwards, throwing government forces back from Idlib’s vicinity and retaking the strategically essential town of Saeqeb three days later.[17] This success cut Syrian control of the M5 highway and ended the encirclement of the Turkish observation posts on the town’s outskirts.

That same day, Syrian and Russian airstrikes, attacking rebel and Turkish forces to slow their advance, hit a Turkish military unit near Idlib’s southern front, killing at least 33 Turkish soldiers.[18] Ankara considered this a significant escalation and massively increased attacks of Syrian government forces across northern Syria in an air and ground offensive later named “Operation Peace Springs.” On February 28^th alone, Turkey attacked 200 Syrian Government targets using drones, aircraft and artillery, killing around 100 Syrian and Iranian soldiers. Turkish drone strikes also destroyed advanced Russian air defences, and Funerals for pro-Iranian fighters attracted thousands of mourners in Lebanon.[19]

 Turkish and rebel forces also began pushing government forces back in the southern Idlib front around the Zawiya mountains throughout the first days of March, shooting down two Syrian SU-24 bombers on March 1st and inflicting heavy casualties on pro-government forces.

Saraqib Counterattack

The Syrian government and its allies likely realised that Turkey’s direct entry into the conflict had removed the possibility of taking Idlib and ending the rebellion. However, they recognised that the loss of Saraqib and, consequently, control over the M5 highway was the primary strategic problem that had to be resolved to salvage some success from the battle. Accordingly, they had amassed a significant force to retake the town, which Turkey claimed contained 2000 pro-Iranian militia soldiers. Indeed, the force was exceedingly diverse, containing Syrian Arab army units, IRGC officers, Russian mercenaries and potentially regular Russian soldiers. A generous compliment of Russian airstrikes would also support the attack.

The assault commenced on the second of March, and pro-government forces were quickly able to break into the east of the town, supported by 140 Russian and Syrian airstrikes.[20] Rebel forces complained of professional Russian soldiers engaging in the battle directly, but Moscow contended that these men were there only to establish a humanitarian corridor. In all likelihood, however, Russian and Turkish regular forces were now engaged in house-to-house combat as each other’s aircraft attacked from the sky. Remarkably, this situation of armed conflict between Turkey and Russia did not damage their relations outside of Syria, and both sides viewed the fighting as an inconvenience to otherwise improving bilateral relations. Turkey simply blamed Syria for any soldiers Russian strikes killed. [21]

 Fighting continued into the next day, but by the evening, Syrian forces had retaken the town and resecured the M5 highway.[22] Rebel forces counterattacked the following day, backed by Turkish drone strikes, but failed to retake the town.

With fighting between Iranian/Russian and regular Turkish army units escalating, all sides became eager to end the fighting. Turkey had made clear that its military would deny any attempts to take Idlib, while Assad had maintained a strategic victory by keeping control of the M5 highway. Consequently, a meeting between Putin and Erdogan in Moscow was conducted on the 5th of March, and a ceasefire was signed, which went into effect at midnight. This agreement ended the fighting in Idlib and froze the Syrian war until the time of writing three years later, making the Battle of Saraqib the last conventional clash of the decade-long conflict.

The assault commenced on the second of March, and pro-government forces were quickly able to break into the east of the town, supported by 140 Russian and Syrian airstrikes.[20] Rebel forces complained of professional Russian soldiers engaging in the battle directly, but Moscow contended that these men were there only to establish a humanitarian corridor. In all likelihood, however, Russian and Turkish regular forces were now engaged in house-to-house combat as each other’s aircraft attacked from the sky. Remarkably, this situation of armed conflict between Turkey and Russia did not damage their relations outside of Syria, and both sides viewed the fighting as an inconvenience to otherwise improving bilateral relations. Turkey simply blamed Syria for any soldiers Russian strikes killed. [21]

The International Situation

To understand the bizarre scenario that unfolded in northern Syria between Turkey, Russia and Iran in late February and early March, the international context surrounding the battle must be considered. This section cannot fully explain the complex geopolitical situation. However, it will attempt to provide a simplified summary.

Turkey’s relationship with Russia in late 2019 and early 2020 was dominated by Ankara’s growing antagonism with the West and, consequently, warming ties with Russia. A deal Turkey signed to buy the S-400, an advanced Russian air defence system, had escalated the dispute, causing the United States to remove Turkey from the F-35 fighter jet program in 2019, a major blow to Turkey’s military. Turkey’s growing suspicion of America and the collective West after the 2016 coup attempt against the Erdogan administration had prompted it to diversify its security relationships, and it viewed improving ties with Russia as an important aspect of this. Consequently, when Russian and Turkish troops came into armed contact in February 2020, Ankara decided against escalating the situation and instead held Syria, its clear enemy, responsible for any casualties.  

Iran was another key player who behaved bizarrely in this conflict. Iranian militia forces and its IRGC officers who acted as commanders and advisers in the battle were hit hard by Turkish airstrikes, suffering heavy casualties, but Tehran also relented from escalating the situation. This was because Iranian foreign policy at that moment was dominated by the increasingly likely prospect of war with the United States around the Persian Gulf after the assassination of Iran’s top military commander the month prior. Consequently, Tehran had no interest in escalating a conflict with Turkey, its powerful northern neighbour, when war with the US looked possible further south.

Russia was well aware of Turkey’s awkward position regarding the United States and Iran’s focus on a potential war with Washington. It also saw that Iran’s power in Syria had been temporarily but significantly disrupted by the killing of General Qasem Soleimani, who had acted as Iran’s chief commander and organiser in Syria. Consequently, Russia pushed for an offensive against the last rebel holdout in Syria, believing the international situation was sufficiently favourable to limit Turkey’s counteractions.

 It also seemed that Russia was seeking to maximise its own involvement while limiting Iranian influence in any potential military success. Iranian militias appeared to play a junior role in the fighting until the last clash in Saeqeb, whereas the Russian-commanded “5^th Corp” played a central role in the most essential parts of the offensive. Russia’s airstrikes were also entirely behind the operation, which was not always true when Iranian militias played a leading role.[23] This is because, despite being allies, Russia and Iran are deeply suspicious of one another’s intentions in Syria and have both been eager to weaken each other’s position when possible. Consequently, it seems Russia believed it could get away with securing Idlib with its Syrian militias, rather than Iranian ones, without Turkey reacting forcefully enough to stop them.

These theories, however, are far from proven, as clearer information on the aims, relationships and disagreements between Turkey, Iran, and Russia was not available for this essay.

Conclusion

The winter of 2020 witnessed the serene olive groves of Northern Syria be torn asunder by a blizzard of bullets, shells, and airstrikes. The loss and injury of thousands of soldiers was the result. For the civilian population, the battle was nothing short of a calamity, 980,000 individuals were displaced, forced out of their homes and into the biting winter, which hosted temperatures as low as -15 degrees Celsius. Many, including infants, perished in the icy conditions. Just weeks later, the region struggled with the COVID-19 pandemic, further escalating the suffering of refugees. Amid the geopolitical manoeuvres of Turkey, Iran, and Russia, it’s crucial to recognise that the civilians in flight and the wounded soldiers bore the gravest consequences of these power plays.

Nevertheless, as bizarre as it seems, the fighting in Idlib did bring about lasting stability. The battle ended in a ceasefire that has held for over three years, a period unprecedented in the Syrian conflict. As of 2023, this peace looks as if it will hold and solidify into something more permanent, given Syria’s re-admission into the Arab League and Turkey’s supposed willingness to negotiate with Assad.

Consequently, these clashes in early 2020, which dictated this new peace, may shape Syria and the regional order for decades. The complex geopolitical realities of the fighting, which enabled regional and global powers to fight one another without harming relations, demonstrate a remarkable example of realpolitik. These elements make it a fascinating affair that deserves more attention from experts and academics. It is sincerely hoped that in a few years, a comprehensive investigation into this conflict will shed some light on the objectives of both sides and the geopolitical dynamics that played out between them.

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Bibliography

[1] Tom Cooper, 2018, Helion and Company, Moscow’s Game of Poker, P.9

[2] Christopher Philips, 2016, Yale University Press, The Battle For Syria, P.140

[3] Centre for Preventive Action, August 08, 2023, Global Conflict Tracker, Conflict Between Turkey and Armed Kurdish Groups, “https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-turkey-and-armed-kurdish-groups”

[4] Ben Hubbard and Eric Schmitt, Oct. 14, 2019, Assad Forces Surge Forward in Syria as U.S. Pulls Back, The New York Times, “https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/world/europe/syria-us-assad-kurds-turkey.html”

Daily Sabah. “Turkey-backed SNA launch operation to retake Saraqib from Assad forces.” Last modified February 10, 2020. https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2020/02/10/turkey-backed-sna-launch-operation-to-retake-saraqib-from-assad-forces

[6] Hodge, Jeremy. “As Assad and Putin Forces Advance in Syria, It’s the Death Rattle of the Arab Spring.” The Daily Beast. Last modified February 11, 2020.

[7] BBC news, 2020,  https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-45401474

[8] Middle East Institute, 2019, https://www.mei.edu/publications/lion-and-eagle-syrian-arab-armys-destruction-and-rebirth#pt

[9] Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 2020

[10] BBC News. “Syria war: Army ‘recaptures’ key town from opposition in Idlib.” Last modified January 29, 2020. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-51293327

[11] ibid.

[12]The Moscow Times, 2020

[13] Al-Aswad, Harun. “Syrian government forces besiege Idlib’s strategic Saraqeb.” Middle East Eye. Last modified February 6, 2020. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syrian-government-forces-besiege-idlibs-strategic-saraqeb

[14] The New York Times. “Syrian Attack Draws Turkey Deeper into Syrian Civil War.” February 12, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/12/world/middleeast/syria-turkey-russia-war.html

[15] Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. “Turkish forces and opposition factions storm Al-Nayrab amid fierce battles with regime forces.” February 20, 2020. https://www.syriahr.com/en/155453/

[16] Ibid.

[17] Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. “Turkish forces and proxy factions capture Saraqeb city, cutting off Damascus-Aleppo international highway.” Last modified February 27, 2020. https://www.syriahr.com/en/155889/

[18] Wilson, Audrey. “Airstrike Against Turkish Troops Could Reshape the Syrian War.” Foreign Policy. Last modified February 28, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/28/airstrike-turkey-turkish-troops-syrian-war-conflict-russia-erdogan-refugees/

[19] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w8aYR42Ysa4

[20] Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. “Opposition factions capture more areas in south Idlib as regime forces advance into Saraqeb.” Last modified March 2, 2020. https://www.syriahr.com/en/156173/

[21] The Guardian. “Dozens of Turkish soldiers killed in strike in Idlib in Syria, reports say.” Last modified February 27, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/27/dozens-of-turkish-soldiers-killed-in-strike-in-idlib-in-syria-reports-say

[22] Middle East Monitor. “Syria army retakes Saraqib city in Idlib from opposition.” March 2, 2020. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200302-syria-army-retakes-saraqib-city-in-idlib-from-opposition/

[23][23] Tom Cooper, 2018, Helion and Company, Moscow’s Game of Poker, P.43