Recent reports suggest that the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has taken delivery of the first two SU-35E Flankers from a purported order of 50 on November 18th 2024. This represents an unprecedented step forward in the IRI’s conventional defence capabilities. The acquisition of these Flankers reflects a changing strategic vision for strengthening Iran’s military. This article explores the significant advantages the SU-35E could provide the Islamic Republic. The SU-35, if acquired with the appropriate weapons and infrastructure, would act as an effective deterrence to unilateral Israeli strikes and would even complicate American military operations against Iran. The Flanker’s acquisition, if true, would represent a potential first step in rebuilding Iran’s conventional military capabilities.
No photos of the SU-35 in Iran have surfaced, raising doubts about the veracity of the delivery claim. However, Iran has flirted with purchasing SU-35s from Russia, especially those 24 units left undelivered to Egypt, for years. Iran has received other advanced technologies from Russia, including helicopters and the YAK 130, a trainer aircraft used to train SU-35 pilots. This, as well as the expansion of Iran and Russia’s military cooperation since Moscow’s intervention in Syria and the invasion of Ukraine, indicates that Iran will acquire these jets soon, even if it has not done so already.
The SU-35 is a world-class multi-role fighter aircraft. It is primarily designed for air combat and has been used extensively by Russia over Ukraine for this purpose. Iran has already, and largely autonomously, developed an extensive and seemingly effective air defence network consisting of homegrown missile systems. These systems seemed to have performed well against Israel’s air attacks on Iran in early November (though the evidence remains inconclusive and is bitterly contested by Western outlets). The SU-35 would represent a significant boost for Iran in its air defence capabilities, especially regarding Israel. Israel’s air operations against Iran in November 2024 demonstrated an already apparent difficulty in bombing Iran directly with its air force due to the large distances involved, over 1000km, close to the practical operational limits of its advanced F-15 variants and F-35s.
Israel’s F-35s would still outperform the Iranian SU-35s. However, their presence would compel Israel to allocate more aircraft to air defence roles and fewer to bombing missions, thereby reducing the potential damage to Iranian assets. Moreover, if Iran could obtain 50 Flankers with suitable weapon systems to confront Israeli air attacks, it would present a significant challenge to IDF planners.
The SU-35 could also deter other large military powers around Iran, especially Turkey (which theoretically currently lacks a fighter aircraft as advanced as an SU-35) and the Gulf states.
A fleet of 50 SU-35s with the correct infrastructure and resources (appropriately defended airbases and the proper suit of air-to-air missiles and air-to-ground ordinance) would give Iran unprecedented conventional military capabilities. For the first time, it would allow Iran to conduct various air operations, including precision strategic bombing and close air support.
Iran previously addressed its lack of air power with drones and cruise and ballistic missiles. Missiles provided Iran with a short to long-range strategic strike capability. In contrast, drones offered Iran the ability for both strategic bombing and conducting close air support, depending on the model. These options were surprisingly effective and caused havoc to Iran’s rivals. Iranian missile and drone strikes on the Saudi oil industry in 2019 knocked out half the country’s oil production. This compelled Saudi Arabia to make a significant strategic realignment to reduce tensions with Tehran.
Iranian ballistic missiles have also proven capable of breaking through Israel’s Iron Dome on two occasions. However, these missiles were unable to achieve meaningful damage to Israel despite breaking through her air defences. Israeli airpower, in return, decimated Iranian military infrastructure in Lebanon and Syria, significantly contributing to the loss of the latter. Such clashes highlighted Iran’s need for an Air Force with modern capabilities. If Iran were to reform its armed force into a smaller yet more motivated, offensively capable military force, it could provide Iran with significantly more leverage against its conventional powerful neighbours in its near abroad. Turkey would be a logical starting point for Iran’s expanded conventional strategy. A stronger conventional Iran would be able to provide much-needed support to its Armenian ally, preventing continued Azeri-Turkish infringements of its sovereignty.
Iran’s acquisition of SU-35s would not be just another routine arms purchase for a Middle Eastern country. It would significantly enhance the capabilities of the Iranian military and could profoundly shift its strategic position. Persian SU-35s could challenge Israel’s unilateral ability to strike Iran and force a reassessment of Tehran’s broader regional strategy. Considering Iran’s critical geopolitical position and the likelihood of escalating tensions with its adversaries, particularly with the incoming Trump administration, this is an important development.