On December 8th, 2024, Damascus, the capital of the Assad regime and the central node of Iranian influence in Syria, fell to Turkish-backed rebels after an inconceivably rapid 11-day offensive. This development did not materialise out of air; it came off the back of an intense year-long conflict between Iran’s regional security network, the Axis of Resistance (AoR) and Israel. A conflict Iran has struggled with, given the collapse of its control of Syria and the severing of its land bridge to Hezbollah in Lebanon. This paper will analyse the possibility that Iran may readdress its regional security policy.
The Doctrine of Iran’s Guards
T
Since its conception during the transformative 1979 Islamic revolution, the Islamic Republic has pursued a regional foreign policy aimed at spreading the revolution’s ideals. The clearest of these aims is the dissolution of Israel and the removal of American power from West Asia.
The viability of achieving such objectives through conventional military force was put to the test in 8 years of war with Iraq. Iran initially focused on repelling the Iraqi invasion, but its objectives shifted once the Iraqi army faltered. Iran began pushing to topple Saddam Hussein in a regional war that aimed to spread the revolution across the region, ultimately destroying Israel. However, Iran’s conventional military could not overcome Saddam’s Western-buttressed armed forces.
Consequently, Iran’s military doctrine became increasingly unconventional to circumvent its weaknesses in conventional force. The IRGC became the primary security institution that wielded these unconventional abilities across regional borders under its foreign service branch, the Quds Force.
The primary tools of these forces were militias and ever-stronger ballistic missiles for offensive attacks and deterrence, and anti-air missiles for defence. Militias would be deployed or created in neighbouring failing states to influence them and put pressure on hostile Western forces and Israel. Between 2003 and 2020, through a remarkable set of circumstances and exceptional continuity of policy, Iran was able to pull this off in several states, building a security network called the “Axis of Resistance” (AoR), becoming a dominant regional power in the process, putting extensive military pressure on Israel’s borders.
The AoR gave Iran power to move forces through Iraq and Syria to Israel’s northern front with Lebanon. It also gave Iran influence and tools to support Hamas in Gaza and the Houthis in Yemen. The IRGC planned to surround Israel with a “ring of fire”. They hoped to expand the AoR into the southern territories around Israel, controlled by the Western secular Arab states of Egypt and Jordan. This would complete the plan and encapsulate Israel around hostile populations that supported local militias, which couldn’t be destroyed without targeting the population itself. This would push Israel into causing massive civilian casualties for little gain, which in turn would only further enhance regional public support for the AoR, allowing it to expand in other directions.
The AoR’s War with Israel
October 7th, 2023 – December 8th 2024
On October 7th 2023, Hamas, the AoR component Iran had the least influence over, attacked Israel. To what extent Iran was involved is an unanswered question. In any case, Hamas aimed to suck the AoR into a war with Israel. The succeeding regional conflict between the AoR and Israel would last over a year.
On October 7th, Hamas targeted Israel’s civilian population to pressure the right-wing Israeli government into launching a war against Gaza. By killing over one thousand people, mostly civilians, Hamas succeeded. Israel responded with a genocidal aerial onslaught, pressuring Hezbollah to open a second front. This displaced Israel’s northern population, demonstrating the AoR’s ability to put significant pressure on Israel without directly involving Iran.
For a year, the AoR did well. Israel achieved little in Gaza except the mass killing of civilians. In the year after October 7th, Israel killed nearly 42,000 people, 70% were women and children. Consequently, regional support for Iran and the AoR increased, and secular Arab governments that favoured cooperation with Israel were delegitimised.
But in September 2024, Israel changed course. The IDF commenced targeting the AoR outside of Gaza. This started with indiscriminate pager attacks in Lebanon on September 17th, ensuring thousands of Hezbollah and Iranian personnel, along with scores of civilians, were killed or injured. Israel commenced a bombing campaign against Hezbollah and invaded Lebanon. Israel had already assassinated Iranian commanders across Syria and political leaders in Iran, killing Hamas’s Haniya in Tehran in July and bombing the Iranian embassy in Damascus in April, killing key Iranian commanders in Syria. On September 27th, Israeli airstrikes killed Hassan Nasrullah, the leader of Hezbollah.
The AoR was shocked by the accuracy of Israel’s targeting and the damage dealt. Iran responded directly by launching ballistic missile strikes on Israel to deter them, most notably on October 1st 2024, which breached Israel’s much-vaunted Iron Dome, hitting Tel Aviv and damaging Israeli military bases. It also helped its AoR proxies in Iraq and Yemen to hit Israel with drones and was able to maintain the cohesion of Hezbollah, holding Israel at Lebanon’s southern border. These counterblows were insufficient to turn the tables of war. Hezbollah’s leadership was shattered, and the IRGC was exhausted. The damage inflicted on Israel struck short of strategic.
The result, seemingly, on November 28th, was a ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel, giving the AoR space to lick its wounds. But the consequences were graver. That same day, Turkish-backed rebels invaded Assad-controlled Syria. The Syrian army, predominantly underpaid conscripts, was without the usual supervision of Iranian and Hezbollah commanders (who had either been killed or redirected to the Lebanese). The Syrian Arab Army collapsed rapidly. Damascus fell on December 8. Syria, the jewel of Iran’s security network, was lost in 11 days.
A Change in Doctrine?
The key weakness of the IRGC’s unconventional military doctrine was always a lack of conventional military force. The failure of Iran in Syria can largely be attributed to Turkey, a rival with vastly superior conventional abilities. Iran cannot contest Turkey in a traditional war. The reason for Iran’s aversion to building up a conventional armed force is that Iran’s foreign policy aims are so expansive that they could not win a ground war against all the players necessary to achieve them. Such enemies include the Gulf Arab states, Turkey, Israel and the United States (essentially the collective West and its regional allies).
Hence, they use the proxy armies of the AoR. With the loss of Syria, this plan is in tatters. Consequently, it would be prudent for Iranian policymakers to readdress and reduce their foreign policy aims and create a better conventional force, combined with what’s left of its proxy ones, to deal with the rapidly approaching storm, which will be the Trump administration.
The Iranian military is an organisation totally separate from the IRGC and does not take an active role in Iran’s foreign efforts. It is underfunded, lacks modern equipment, and is based on an unpopular conscription system. Its air force is worse. Filled with obsolete models from the Cold War era, it is unusable in modern warfare. The purpose of such a military was to deter attacks on Iran itself, which is a mountainous country. However, the experience in Syria should showcase how poorly a demotivated conscription army can perform.
Iran would be wise to strengthen its conventional armed forces by providing them with quality equipment and ensuring they have adequately equipped, trained, and motivated divisions. Reducing the size of the force may yield more cohesive and effective formations capable of performing offensive operations, which is currently not possible due to its chronic lack of modern armoured vehicles and even up-to-date infantry equipment.
Indeed, acquiring SU-35 fighter aircraft (allegedly agreed with Russia) would be a significant first step in readdressing this strategic imbalance. Iran also requires fleets of new armoured vehicles, better uniforms, and small arms.
This is now particularly important as Iran must rely increasingly on diplomacy with its neighbours without its regional security network. It may benefit from cutting back on what most concerns these neighbours: the militia groups on their borders. This is especially important given that the effectiveness of such forces has been significantly undercut due to the loss of Syria.
Struck in Stone
Struck in Stone
Despite the apparent logic of a more realist, local threat-oriented foreign policy, it is unlikely Iran would move in this direction with much purpose. This is because of Iran’s internal dynamics and politics, particularly its state ideology and international vision, and the deep distrust its ruling classes have for secular institutions such as the conventional military and foreign ministry.
The Islamic Republic’s religious leaders have a vision of foreign policy which they label “resistance-based”. The primary aim of this foreign policy is to expel American influence, particularly its military presence, from the region. They also view the dissolution of Israel as an essential part of this. As stated earlier, these objectives cannot be achieved by conventional force. Hence, diverting state resources away from the IRGC and towards the traditional organs of state, like the military, would undermine the effort. It isn’t likely that Iran’s religious leadership would accept the failure of its over 20-year mission, which they have sacrificed so much for.
The distrust the IRGC and other religiously based organisations have for the conventional military and foreign ministry is another factor. The Iranian military is a vast organisation based on the compulsory conscription of the entire male population. As a large proportion of the Iranian population is unsupportive of the government, this calls into question the loyalty of its rank and file. Consequently, empowering such an organisation in its current state and elevating it above the military capabilities of the IRGC would be considered exceptionally risky.
It is also unlikely that the foreign ministry will be given the autonomy to direct Iranian foreign policy in this direction. The ministry is not constitutionally obligated to make policy; it is only obligated to carry out policy made by other branches of government, including the National Security Council, which the IRGC dominates.
As a result, the foreign ministry can clash with the IRGC. This has especially been the case under the governance of Javad Zarif in the Rohani administration, who tried to resign when Bashar al-Assad, the leader of Syria, was invited to Tehran without even informing him. Since his return to office in 2024 as the “vice president for strategic affairs,” he has faced renewed pressure from conservative factions across the state. The IRGC views him as disloyal to their foreign policy aim and, as a result, untrustworthy. The foreign ministry will remain sidelined.
Conclusion
With the catastrophic loss of Syria, even the IRGC’s most zealous commanders may see the necessity of a realignment. If so, Iran would move its regional policies in a more conventional direction. But to what extent this movement would be is unclear. Iran’s Islamic resistance ideology remains as pertinent as ever. The more conventional organs of the Iranian state are underpowered. The incoming Trump administration may be met with an Islamic republic just as ready for confrontation, perhaps with a few more SU-35s and a few fewer militias.
With the tensions between secular organizations and the government/IRGC, is it right in assuming that any regime change will be based from and led by the military?
Such scenarios are hard to predict. But the IRGC and military would play important roles for certainty.