Between 2011 and 2016, Western policymakers were interested in negotiations with Iran to prevent it from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Western policymakers, however, have always been divided on whether bringing Iran into the international order would also reduce its tendency to use armed force to achieve its security objectives.
This is Part 1 of a 4-part essay series analysing this question through the lenses of different IR theories. This paper analyses the question through the lens of Realism.
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Realist view of International Relations
Realism is a theory of international relations that was one of the most popular and utilised throughout the Cold War. Its beliefs are centred around power being a defining characteristic of international relations, that states are the system’s only significant actors and view each other primarily regarding power and military capabilities. In the realist view, the international order is fundamentally anarchic. (Glaser, 2022, p. 21-36)
Due to its simplicity, it has been one of the most prominent international relations theories and, in the 21st century, has remained at the forefront of explaining the actions of states and devising foreign policy strategies for countries. Scholars like Trita Parsi have attributed Realms to explaining almost all of Iran’s military endeavours across the Middle East. (Parsi) Mearsheimer, another prominent, though controversial, scholar, has attributed realism to being a perfect explanation for the Russian Federation’s renewed military operations in Ukraine (Mearsheimer, 2014).
Several realist scholars have attempted to define the international order. Hans Morgenthau defines it as “a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or international society” (Morgenthau, 1948, p.220). Kenneth Waltz stated that “International order is produced by the ordering principle of anarchy and the distribution of capabilities across units, not by any deliberate effort to create order” (Waltz, 1979, p.88). Robert Gilpin also stated that “International order is the distribution of power and authority among the political units of the international system.”
These realist scholars have generally focused on the idea of states and power as defining the primary characteristic of the international system. However, some realist scholars do accept the value of rules and norms as essential aspects of the international order. Mearsheimer, for example, one of the most prominent realist scholars, in an age where realism is not as popular as it was in the Cold War, defined the international order as “the governing arrangements among a group of states, including its fundamental rules, principles, and institutions.” (Mearsheimer, 2001, p.35). Moreover, Krasner states, “International order is maintained by shared expectations, norms, and rules among states that constrain the use of force and promote cooperation.” (Krasner, 1985, p.17).
However, realists generally do not accept that integration into an international system will impact state behaviour and, accordingly, the likelihood of revisionist states using armed forces to achieve their objectives. As Mearsheimer states, “International institutions have minimal influence on state behaviour, and the claim that they can deter aggressive behaviour is a delusion. “States act according to their national interests and the balance of power, not because they are integrated into the international system.” (Mearsheimer, 2001, p.364)
In any case, even within realism, a view that institutions and norms are also important aspects of international relations has emerged. However, this view is combined with an understanding that states and power are still superior in significance and that these institutions do a poor job of restraining them. There is also an understanding that these institutions may only provide an avenue for states to pursue power in politics through means outside of military power when they do not suit them for whatever reason. This begins to be an essential basis of Stacie Goddard’s “post-realist” understandings, as will be seen later.
Realism had come under increasing scrutiny in the aftermath of the Cold War. Its focus on international relations being a zero-sum game was seen as untrue, with growing support for integrating non-liberal powers like China and Russia into the international order. Realism, military power, and state-centric approaches failed to adequately explain the increasing support and power of international institutions and respect for international law (Goddard, 2016, p.4). Scholars from other paradigms of international relations, like the constructivist Alexander Wendt, suggested that “The failure of realism to predict or explain the peaceful end of the Cold War shows the necessity of a theory that acknowledges the role of social structures and shared understandings in shaping state behaviour” (Wendt, 1999, p.5). Realist scholars accepted this setback. Waltz asserted in 2002 that “The post-Cold War world, dominated by international institutions and the spread of liberal democracy, poses a challenge for realist assumptions” (Wendt, 2002). Hence, realism’s understanding of the international order lost its hegemonic status.
Realism and Iranian Foreign Policy
Despite the criticisms realism often comes under, several scholars who consider themselves realists have utilised this theory to understand Iranian foerign policy and devise policies to deal with the Islamic republic. Iran aims to roll back American influence across its region, the Middle East and has not shied away from using armed force to achieve its goals. Support for foreign militias is one of Iran’s primary foreign policy tools. Iran also uses ballistic missiles and drones as a deterrence to any state that wishes to attack it directly to bypass Iran’s forward militia-based forces.
It uses drone and missile forces to strike its regional rivals and the United States directly. It is very likely that in 2019, it carried out an extensive drone and missile attack on its neighbour, Saudi Arabia, which significantly damaged its oil infrastructure. In 2020, it directly targeted the American al-Assad base in Iraq with ballistic missiles, injuring scores of US servicemen. In 2024, it targeted elements it considered hostile in Pakistan and launched hundreds of missiles and drones at Israel directly, some hitting military infrastructure. This is separate from the extensive missile attacks its proxy militias also carry out across Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen.
The Islamic Republic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) and its foreign operations unit, the Quds Force (IRGCQF), generally sustain the forces that carry out these operations to different degrees. These entities are separate from the conventional Iranian military, which is tasked with guarding Iran itself and managing non-ideological security threats. (Abedin, 2019)
Despite realism’s tendency to object to the importance of international institutions, some of the most prominent modern realist scholars believe integrating Iran into these institutions and the broader international order would reduce Iran’s use of armed force. This is because realists believe that security is the most important factor in an anarchical international system.
Accordingly, Iran’s use of armed force as a tool of foreign policy must be almost entirely a result of Iran trying to ensure its own security. Hence, the right policy option is reducing the security threats to Tehran while rewarding it for pursuing better integration with the international order and making continuous use of armed force too costly. Indeed, Mearsheimer stated that “The U.S. should focus on balancing Iran’s power rather than engaging in regime change or spreading democracy. Such attempts will likely backfire, as Iran’s actions are rooted in its need for security in a hostile region” (Mearsheimer, 2018, p.85). Stephen Walt suggested, “Instead of seeking to dominate the Middle East, the U.S. should adopt a policy of offshore balancing, which entails leaving regional powers to check Iran while maintaining diplomatic engagement.”(Walt, 2005, p.243).
Trita Parsi is one of the most prominent realist scholars advocating for this approach towards Iran. Trita Parsi is an Iranian-Swedish academic who advised the Obama administration on aspects of the Iranian nuclear deal. He vehemently rejects constructivist notions that ideological factors guide Iran and believes the power dynamics of the Middle East, the local regional power structure, guide Iranian foreign policy and its use of armed force (Parsi, 2005, p.247). He believes that the US’s invasion of Iraq and the Syrian civil war broke the power of Arab states in the region, causing a power vacuum that Iran and Israel are fighting to fill. If one dominates the region, it will threaten the other (Parsi, 2005, p.252). Hence, integrating Iran and creating a regional balance of power will persuade Iran that it does not need to use armed force to secure itself.
Notably, however, this differs from Stacy Goddard’s view of international relations. Goddard contends that integrating a revisionist state like Iran into the international order would only change the methods Iran uses to achieve its revisionist objectives, not alter the objectives themselves. Stacie Goddard does not include a reason as to why revisionist states become revisionist; she only comments on how to change their policies.
In summary, Realists believe power dynamics dominate the international order, and these dynamics impose realities that states have to abide by. In the Middle East, this indicates that Iran is forced to adopt an aggressive posture and use armed force. In their view, integrating Iran into the international system would successfully reduce the security threat to Iran. This would mean Tehran wouldn’t use armed force as there would be no need, as its primary objective was always only to preserve its own security, no matter what rhetoric emanated from Tehran’s minarets on the topic of resistance and regional justice.