Between 2011 and 2016, western policymakers became interested in making a deal with Iran to prevent it from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Western policymakers, however, have always been divided on whether bringing Iran into the international order would also reduce its tendency to use armed force to achieve its security objectives.
This is Part 3 of a 4-part essay series analysing this question through the lenses of different IR theories. This essay analyses the question through the lens of Constructivism.
Constructivist view of international order.
Constructivism is like liberalism and is an alternative approach to understanding international relations. A key scholar in this field is Alexander Wendt, who sought to establish constructivism as a more formal theory in the 1990s with his influential work “Social Theory of International Politics.” Constructivism may offer a more nuanced explanation of the challenges involved in integrating Iran into the international system compared to liberalism or realism, particularly when analysing Iran’s use of military force.
Constructivism argues that states construct their view of the international order based on their identities and perceptions of the world. In this view, the international order is shaped by these ideas, identities, and the norms that states perceive to exist. Thus, if the international order is perceived as anarchic, it is because states believe it to be so. How states behave within this anarchy is not determined by the structure of the international system itself, as realists might argue, but rather by each state’s individual interpretation of that system (Agius, 2022, p.75).
Although constructivism has been criticised for being overly complex and resembling a sociological approach due to its focus on how individuals perceive and understand the world, Wendt maintained that constructivism is still state-centric. As Wendt argued, “It makes no more sense to criticise a theory of international politics as state-centric than it does to criticise a theory of forests for being tree-centric” (Wendt, 1999, p.9).
Hence, the theory remains particularly useful in analysing the decision-making of states such as Iran, especially regarding what factors would or would not increase the likelihood of Iran resorting to military force. Constructivism offers insight into why Iran might feel compelled to use military force despite integration into international institutions by emphasising how Iran constructs its identity and perceives threats in the international system. Rather than assuming that state behaviour is solely determined by material factors (as in realism) or cooperation-driven norms (as in liberalism), constructivism provides a lens to understand how Iran’s unique ideological identity, rooted in its revolutionary principles and resistance to Western hegemony, shapes its military strategies and foreign policy actions.
This approach allows for a more context-oriented analysis. Iran’s behaviour is influenced by its understanding of itself as a revolutionary state, historical narratives of resistance, and interpretation of international norms. Accordingly, Constructivism enables a deeper understanding of Iran’s use of military force, particularly when considering how the country’s leadership views its role within the Islamic world and its relationship with Western powers. Through this understanding, it becomes evident that integration into the international system may not reduce Iran’s use of armed force.
Constructivism and Iranian foreign policy.
Constructivism is well placed to understand the counterargument to the previous theories’ perceptions that suggest integrating Iran into the international system would reduce its use of armed force. This is because Iran views the international order in a very different way from the way realists and liberalists understand it. Iran’s revolutionary ideology may be so strong that it ignores typical realities of international systems and security threats. As Alexander Wendt himself states, “Iran’s behaviour in the Middle East is not simply a product of anarchy but reflects its constructed identity as a regional leader and defender of Shi’a Islam, which shapes its foreign policy decisions” (Wendt, 1999, p.239).
Iran is an Islamic republic, a hybrid between a theocracy and a democracy, developed by Islamic thinkers such as Imam Khomeini, Iran’s first Supreme Leader, after overthrowing the pro-western Shaah in 1979. These thinkers had an Islam-centric perception of the international order.
Khomeini’s ideology centred around the belief that Islam should form the foundation of Iran’s governing system. He argued that only religious officials were adequately qualified to interpret Islamic guidance and thus should oversee state institutions. At this system’s helm would be a supreme Islamic jurist, responsible for guiding the nation according to Islamic principles, a system known as “Wilayat al Faqhi,” or the “Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist.” This vision became the cornerstone of the Islamic Republic once Imam Khomeini took power (Ghorayeb, 2002)
However, Khomeini’s vision extended far beyond domestic governance. He supported a radical international ideology that rejected the modern concept of nation-states and borders as un-Islamic. Instead, he envisioned the “Ummah”—the global Islamic community—as a unified entity. Iran was just the starting point. He made this clear, stating, “We do not recognise Iran as ours, as all Muslim countries are part of us” (Takeyh, 2009, p.18).
Khomeini identified clear foreign enemies in his ideology, particularly Western nations—most notably the United States—which he accused of oppressing the Islamic world”(Takeyh, 2009, p.18). He saw Israel as the pinnacle of Western intrusion into the Islamic heartland, particularly with its presence in Jerusalem, a sacred city in Islam. As a result, the dissolution of Israel became an essential goal for the Islamic Republic, a focus that has persisted since the revolution.
Though revolutionary ideologies often soften when faced with practical political realities, Iran has maintained many of Khomeini’s core beliefs. While Iran may have relented on an overt policy to rule over the entire Islamic world and been far less vocal in rejecting the international system entirely, the core of Khomeini’s resistance to the West and Israel has remained central to Iranian foreign policy.
For over four decades, Iran has relentlessly pursued the goal of Israel’s dissolution, enduring extensive economic and military costs in the process. This commitment has persisted despite the inherent risks of confronting both regional and global powers, such as Israel and the United States, who possess far superior military capabilities, including nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, Iran’s ideological dedication to opposing Israel, rooted in the revolutionary principles established by Imam Khomeini, has remained a central aspect of its foreign policy. This commitment has led to Iran supporting proxy groups, such as the region’s largest non-state armed group, Hezbollah, and engaging in direct military actions in the region, even when these actions heighten the risk of conflict with nuclear-capable adversaries.
Although its relatively lighter, less advanced military capabilities compared to global powers, Iran’s foreign policy decisions regarding Israel highlight the depth of its ideological stance, which theories like realism and liberalism may fail to properly grasp, where strategic calculation often takes a back seat to ideological conviction.
According to Takeyh, Khomeini’s success in embedding his revolutionary ideology into the fabric of the Iranian state is what sets his revolution apart from others of the 20th century. He points out that Iran’s political elites continue to rely on Khomeini’s ideology to legitimise their actions, particularly in foreign policy regarding Israel and resistance to Western powers”(Takeyh, 2009, p.22). This view is supported by scholars such as Przemysław Osiiewicz, who argues that “Iranian politicians in general and diplomats in particular still have to obey the political and religious ideas of Khomeini. ” (Osiewicz, 2021, p.49).
Similarly, Mahan Abedin, a British-Iranian expert in the field, contends that Iran’s ideological commitment to Israel’s destruction has only intensified since the revolution. He, along with other scholars, supports the notion that Khomeini’s ideology remains deeply entrenched in Iran’s governance and foreign policy, particularly regarding Israel. Takeyh attributes this durability to Khomeini’s ability to weave his revolutionary principles into the social fabric of Iranian society and the dense institutionalisation of those principles.
The consequence of all of this is that integration into the international order, even if it does offer Iran extensive economic and security benefits, may not be enough to reduce Iran’s use of arms force or general revisionism. This is because Iran understands the world in a distinct way. It believes fundamentally that it must mobilise its resources to fight opponents it views as fundamental enemies for ideological rather than security reasons. This is not a new understanding; scholars pointed out this reality more than a decade before JCPOA negotiations. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, constructivist scholars, stated that “Iran’s engagement with non-state actors and regional interventions are justified through a framework of resistance and support for oppressed Muslim communities, which are norms central to its revolutionary identity” (Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 1998, p.905). Ted Hopf stated that “Iran’s actions reflect a desire to assert its identity as a revolutionary state that opposes Western hegemony, which is embedded in both its domestic narrative and its foreign policy” (Hopf, 2002, p.9). None of these factors should change if Iran were integrated into the international system. Though it could be argued how they aim to achieve these aims would be regulated as they would use institutions instead of armed forces, but with regional aims as ambitious as the destruction of Israel, this view is questionable.
To summarise, constructivism is an interpretation of international affairs based on how states themselves perceive their surroundings. These understandings are shaped by their own identity and history. This means that integration into the international system will mean different things to different states. Regarding Iran, this puts into question the view that integrating it more closely into the international system would change its use of armed force, given the revolutionary ideology that continues to exert extensive influence over its foreign policy.