This came as a shock to many security analysts the world over. History will likely judge them to be fools for their surprise, given that Russia had amassed around two hundred thousand men on the border, along with all equipment possibly needed to launch such an invasion. But surprised they were. They weren\u2019t fools. It was unfathomable that Russia would launch such an invasion. The Risk of launching an invasion on this scale is monumental and is usually reserved for situations when only a military success could negate a fundamental security threat. But for Ukraine, such a clear motivation seemed absent. Ukraine was no direct threat. Though Russia has serious security concerns regarding Ukraine joining NATO, this was certainly not imminent. International relations theories, such as realism, assume a state is entirely rational and will always act in that manner. This thought process fails when applied to this situation. In reality, a state\u2019s foreign policy and strategic decisions come down to the human individuals who make those decisions, who themselves act in service to their own ideology, political position, and personal experience. Only by mixing the understanding of Russia\u2019s precarious geopolitical situation with the mindset of Russia\u2019s decision-makers can a correct understanding of why Russia invaded Ukraine be attained. The Russian invasion of Ukraine was fundamentally caused by the limited threat a pro-western Ukraine could pose to Russian security. Still, it was the mindset of the Russian leadership, an organisation increasingly dominated by security officials, which made such a conflict inevitable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
To better explain this thesis, it is first necessary to dismiss the often-cited pro-Ukraine and pro-Russian understandings of why the conflict occurred.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The pro-Russian theories as to why the war began are varied but generally state that Russia had no choice but to invade due to Ukraine moving closer to the west and attempting to join NATO. As diplomacy had failed to change Ukraine\u2019s course, military action was the only option remaining to resolve this fundamental threat. Proponents of the thesis bring up the risk that the north European plain poses to Russian security. This is an area of flat land leading from Germany to Moscow, which an invasion force could use to threaten Russia. Historically Russia has tried to control as much of this plain as possible to prevent its use by enemies. Therefore, by moving closer to the West and attempting to join NATO, Ukraine was allowing powerful enemy forces access to the north European plain and so was unfairly threatening the security of Russia. Military action was the only option to resolve this hostile interdiction against Russian security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This theory does have some merit as Russia does possess valid security concerns regarding NATO having forces in Ukraine. However, this theory does not adequately explain Russia\u2019s reasoning to invade. Firstly Ukraine, as stated earlier, was not about to join NATO. Russia had other far safer options to maintain the status quo in this regard, given the support for Detent with Russia in European countries like Germany, the fact that one-third of Ukrainians spoke Russian as a first language and were amenable to Russian interests anyway, and the continuing western shift of focus towards China. Secondly, though Ukraine joining NATO would be a severe security risk to Russia, it would not fundamentally change the geopolitical situation. It is doubtful that NATO forces could drive to Moscow through Ukraine as any serious conflict would involve nuclear weaponry. Moreover, even if such a conflict did not involve such weaponry, the Russian army is at such a disadvantage compared to NATO that even without Ukraine, NATO could cripple Russia\u2019s military capacity. So, though Ukraine joining NATO is a severe problem for Russia, it was not imminent and wasn\u2019t worth the risk of a full-scale invasion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The more Russia phobic opinions on the matter portray Russia\u2019s intentions in Ukraine as essentially empire building. They contend that Putin\u2019s actions are only in line with his dreams of rebuilding the Russian or Soviet empire and cleansing eastern Europe of anything resembling liberal democracy. Putin\u2019s speeches before the war and his claim that the conflict was primarily to \u201cde-nazify\u201d Ukraine does much to support this view. Indeed the claim is not without some validity either. There is certainly an ideological element to this conflict which will be discussed later. But the premise of the claim is invalid overall. The Russian leadership would not risk their limited resources on territorial expansion given that Ukrainian territory would be near useless to them due to how hostile the Ukrainian population is to Russia. Russia\u2019s economy is smaller than Italy\u2019s and was stagnant even before the conflict; it does not possess the resources to rebuild its empire. Such an opinion ignores the geopolitical reality that would prevent Russia from doing so and would assert that Russia has no valid security concerns regarding Ukraine or NATO.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The actual reasoning behind Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine lies in between both previous theses. However, it has much more to do with how Russian leaders perceive Russia\u2019s geopolitical situation, their own political position and ideological beliefs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The risk that Ukraine poses to Russia is elevated in the minds of Russian leaders due to their own perception of Ukraine and understanding of recent history. Simultaneously the attractiveness of the military option to Russian leaders is greatly enhanced due to their views and experiences with military force. The awareness of Russian leaders of the problematic geopolitical situation Russia is in, and their uneasy political situation is mixed into this formula. The result is the use of military force to resolve a real but not critical security threat. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Ukraine was part of The Soviet Union just 33 years ago and was a central component of it throughout the formative years of both Putin and his hard-line advisers. Many of them see the exit of key Russian centres alongside Ukraine as illegitimate and unfair. Especially regarding areas in eastern Ukraine like Kharkiv, Crimea, and even Odesa in the southwest. In the eyes of the Russian leadership, this reality is unacceptable, especially when Ukraine moved away from Russia politically in 2014. The Russian leadership believes Ukraine is undermining the Russian identity of these locations, which they see as having no historical connection to Ukraine other than being on the wrong side of a line in 1991. They view such a situation as an insult to Russian nationalism, compelling Putin to act excessively aggressively toward Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Putin\u2019s ascendancy in Russia brought a government stacked with advisers from Russia\u2019s security and military services, known as the Silovik. Putin\u2019s position has become increasingly reliant on this group of officials in the last decade. Accordingly, these advisers have extensive influence over Putin\u2019s strategic thinking and advocate fervently for military options. They have been key backers of several military operations, such as the violent resolution of the Chechen uprising, the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the 2015 military intervention in Syria. These interventions also consistently succeeded in securing Russian interest in various theatres. It has been proven time and again that when faced with western opposition, a well-placed military operation can protect Russia\u2019s position despite its deficiency in resources. This fact has emboldened this line of militaristic strategic thinking amongst Russian officials. Accordingly, when faced with a security threat from Ukraine, Russian leaders again favoured their tried and tested tactic of military force, which is not only their natural position due to the Silovik\u2019s security background but a position that has proven consistently effective.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The insecurity of Russian leaders regarding their personal positions also pushed them towards more extreme policy options. Putin presides over a nation in decline. In his first decade in power, much was done to restore stability and economic prosperity to Russia. Still, economic growth slowed, and after sanctions were imposed due to his annexation of Crimea in 2014, it stagnated. His offer to the Russian people switched from delivering economic prosperity to defending Russian nationalism. Such a policy needs evident foreign achievements. Consequently, Putin has favoured military options. After the attacks in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea and intervention in Syria, Putin\u2019s approval ratings reached as high as 80%. He understands that military confrontation plays into his nationalistic narrative and promotes him as the best bet for Russia to maintain its position as a global power. Moreover, he understands the difficulty of Russia\u2019s geopolitical situation. Russia has a stagnating economy and cannot contend with the problems in Ukraine regarding its previous annexation of Crimea indefinitely. It needs a solution, and because of Putin\u2019s nationalistic support base, such a solution must guarantee Russia\u2019s control of Crimea and its influence in Russian areas of Ukraine. The Russian leadership decided that diplomacy could not provide an outcome that fit those specifications. So, because of this and all other aspects mentioned, military action was determined to be the only viable solution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia invaded Ukraine because its leadership believed that the threat Ukraine posed to Russia was too significant to be resolved peacefully. Though from an objective standpoint, it may be impossible to conceive that the risk of Ukraine potentially joining NATO in the next decade could be worth a full-scale invasion, it was to the Silovik dominated Russian government. This was due to several factors, the genuine belief that Ukraine was violating the dignity of Russian nationalism, the view that military force was a viable option that could lead to strategic success, and the dependency of Putin\u2019s political support lying with successful foreign achievements. In the end, the mindset of Russia\u2019s leadership and the context of their political position tipped the balance in favour of a military resolution to the Ukraine crisis in February 2022 and was the primary factor behind its occurrence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Shayan Fallahi, March 2022 On the 24th of February 2022, the Russian army shook the world by launching the first major conventional conflict on European soil since the second world war. This came as a shock to many security analysts the world over. History will likely judge them to be fools for their surprise, given […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":4199,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[29,34,30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4190","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-geopolitics","category-ir-theory","category-russia"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.consecon.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4190","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.consecon.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.consecon.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.consecon.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/5"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.consecon.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4190"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.consecon.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4190\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4211,"href":"https:\/\/www.consecon.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4190\/revisions\/4211"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.consecon.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4199"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.consecon.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4190"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.consecon.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4190"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.consecon.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4190"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}![\"\"](\"http:\/\/www.consecon.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/02\/russian-commanders.jpg\")