The 1967 \u201c6-day war\u201d was commenced by Israel on the 5th<\/sup> of June 1967. Israel launched a surprise offensive on three neighbouring states, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Israeli airpower annihilated Arab air forces on the ground in the first days. The Arabs were then forced out of the West Bank, Gaza, Golan Heights and Sinai desert in only six days, comprehensively humiliating the Arab states and Arab nationalism.[1]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n The Yom Kippur War began six years later, on the 6th of October 1973. This war was an attempt by Egypt and Syria to regain lost territories and national pride. Their armies attacked simultaneously from Israel\u2019s north and south. On this occasion, the Israelis were taken by surprise. Syria initially regained ground in the Golan Heights, and the Egyptians impressively crossed the Suez Canal, causing deep concern among the Israeli high command, who believed an arab breakthrough might overwhelm them.[2]<\/a> However, The Arabs failed to take advantage of their early success. The Israelis, after a massive resupply campaign by its ally, the United States, regrouped and counter-attacked, pushing the Syrians back in the north and crossing the Suez Canal themselves in the south, putting both Cairo and Damascus under threat of Israeli attack simultaneously. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Causes<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The causes of the 1967 war are hotly contested. Some contend that the war was stumbled on by a chain of unwanted escalations by both sides exacerbated by domestic pressures and a volatile regional environment made worse by the overarching Cold War. Many contend that it was simply a nihilistic land grab by Israel looking to take advantage of weak arab militaries that surrounded them. Others suggest that the Egyptians planned an aggressive strike on Israel and instigated the war.[3]<\/a> The 1973 war, in contrast, is widely believed to be a war of choice by the Arab states, who saw few other options in regaining their land and prestige.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nasser, Egypt’s arab nationalist president, had faced significant domestic difficulties leading up to the 1967 conflict. [4]<\/a> Nasser had been humiliated by the breakup of the United Arab Republic in 1961, a union between Egypt and Syria. Moreover, Nasser\u2019s intervention in Yemen to support republican forces had overstretched his army and was unpopular. Consequently, he was eager to rebuild his reputation. Illustrating strength against Israel seemed to be an ideal method, especially when considering his attempts to centre himself in the fundamentally anti-Israeli pan-Arab movement. Towards that end, Nasser stepped up his rhetoric against Israel and signed a defence alliance with Syria in 1966.[5]<\/a> The Israelis felt threatened by these actions; though they didn\u2019t expect an Egyptian attack as their best forces were in Yemen, they were suspicouse of Syria whos forces they had clashed with repeatedly<\/p>\n\n\n\n These clashes were over water supplies, territory, and Palestinian insurgencies and led to Israeli strikes on Syria and an aerial skirmish, where six Syrian aircraft were downed.[6]<\/a> This was compounded by a false Soviet report informing Egypt that Israel was mobilising to attack Syria. The Soviets may have faked this to raise the tension and gain a political victory against the US.[7]<\/a> It may also be the case that the Russians genuinely believed the reports.[8]<\/a> In any case, the consequence was an Egyptian mobilisation of two divisions up onto Israel\u2019s border, which further played into Israel\u2019s fears. Egypt then shut down the straights of Tiran to Israeli shipping, crossing Israel\u2019s red line. It remains unclear if the Egyptians intended to provoke a war or only to pressure Israel. In any case, this spiral of escalation resulted in an Israeli assault on Egypt and the seizure of the Sinai Peninsula. The war also escalated unintendedly, with Israel attacking Jordan after it had launched airstrikes under the false belief that Egypt was winning. The Israelis defeated both the Jordanians and Egyptians so comprehensively that they felt it was an ideal opportunity to attack Syria, which they did on the 8th<\/sup> of June, even though apparently this wasn\u2019t initially intended.[9]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n This escalation partly emanated from a security dilemma between the Arabs and Israelis. Even if the Arabs did not imminently plan on war, it was no secret that they were hostile to Israel, and Israel always understood it would use force at some point to combat this. These views are supported by Charles W. Yost, a political journalist writing at the time of the conflict, who confirmed that though neither side initially intended to go to war in 1967, 20 years of previous tensions had made the clash a certainty.[10] Indeed, Cold War tensions only sped up the process. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The 1973 war was one of choice by the Arabs, who were determined to retake their lost territories as soon as Israel had occupied them in 1967. They were in total control of the escalation and were entirely in support of the war taking place in October 1973, in contrast to the previous war, which had not been expected before the summer of 1967. The Israelis had sized strategically vital land in the 1967 war, including Egypt\u2019s Sinai and Syria\u2019s Golan heights. These lands were economically and politically critical to Egypt and Syria, and they felt compelled to retake them by conflict if needed.[11] Egypt was especially desperate to retake its territories. The Suez Canal was vital to the Egyptian economy, and it could not be used while Israel occupied its eastern bank. Moreover, the situation had forced Egypt into massive military spending to maintain its army and conduct the war of attrition against Israel, which had been raging since Israel took the Sinai. <\/p>\n\n\n\n President Sadat had taken over Egypt after Nasser\u2019s death. Sadat\u2019s political position was weak, and he needed to repair Egypt\u2019s geopolitical position to protect his presidency. Sadat initially utilised diplomacy to win back his land. However, Israel rejected his proposals in 1971. The US, the only state with real leverage over Israel, was unwilling to provide diplomatic support, meaning Sadat had decided on war by 1972.[12]<\/a> Indeed, the Egyptian military had been rapidly resupplied by the Soviet Union, which had almost intervened in the 1967 war. In fact, by 1969, the Egyptian army was already 70% rebuilt.[13]<\/a> Sadat envisioned a way to resolve Egypt\u2019s predicament by force and planned for a new war. Therefore, the causes of this war were a purposeful and determined plan by the Arabs to resolve the problems caused by the 1967 war through force due to a lack of practical alternatives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The causes of the 1967 and 1973 wars varied; however, both wars were fundamentally caused by a security dilemma between Arabs and Israelis and extensive mutual animosity. The crucial difference between the conflicts was that the war of 1967 may have been an unintended escalation caused by misinterpretation of enemy moves and domestic pressures, greatly accelerating the outbreak of the conflict. This can be seen by the misinformation provided by the soviets that led to Arab aggression and the closing of the straights of Tiran, an action to which Israel felt compelled to respond. This was different to the 1973 war, which was a clear plan by the Arab to obtain practical objectives. The Arabs tried and failed to find an alternative to conflict and had little choice but to use force. Accordingly, though both wars were caused by the broader security dilemma between Israel and the Arabs, which had lasted since Israel\u2019s creation, the 1967 war resulted from unexpected escalation, whereas the 1973 war was entirely predetermined.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Consequences<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The consequences of the 1967 and 1973 wars vary even more significantly than the causes. Both wars affected Arabs and Israelis differently. The Israelis came out of the 1967 war in an unprecedented position of strength. They had smashed their enemies, the threat of whom had previously held Israeli society together. This led to unprecedented strategic security. However, it also led to an expensive and enduring war of attrition with its neighbours, especially Egypt, who were determined to retrieve their land.[14]<\/a> This led to further economic problems as military spending rose to 25% after the six-day war, escalating internal pressures.[15]<\/a> Despite this, the Israelis did not believe they had to negotiate with the Arabs on even terms; their victories had shown that they were militarily superior and could resolve their issues with force.[16]<\/a> The Arabs, on the other hand, were devastated by the war both morally and economically, so we\u2019re determined to win back their land. They began making several society-wide changes, including seriously improving their military capabilities, especially in training and organisation. Consequently, the Israelis remained insecure, and the Egyptians and Syrians were even more determined to continue their conflict with Israel. The 1967 war had only enhanced the security crisis in the region by putting the Arabs in an impossible geopolitical position and simultaneously overstretching Israeli resources.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The consequences of the 1973 wars were very different. The war had shown the Israelis that they were not as superior as they had believed and forced them to consider diplomacy with the Arabs as a viable alternative. The Arabs, despite their pride being somewhat redeemed by the war, realised that Israel could not be defeated by force due to its uncompromising American support, as had been illustrated by the American airlifts of equipment which enabled Israel\u2019s ferocious counterattack. Sadat wanted to use the war to pressure Israel to obtain the diplomatic return of the Sinai. In contrast, the Syrians and most of the Arab world still viewed Israel as unquestionably an enemy who could not be bargained with. This split the Arab world, crippled Egyptian regional respect and influence, and permanently ended the dream of a pan-Arab union.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The war also had global implications, which would rebound and impact the future of the conflict. The war led to the use of the oil weapon by the Saudis to pressure the west to compel Israel to cease hostilities, the near intervention of the Soviet Union on behalf of the Arabs, along with the massive American military support to Israel in the form of an airlift, and the potential of Israel using nuclear weapons.[17]<\/a> These facts illustrated how significant Middle Eastern affairs were to global security and how crucial a diplomatic solution to it was\u2014this elevated international pressure for peace, enhancing the prospects of it after the war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Consequently, the results of 1973 were far more conclusive and put Israel in an even stronger position than the conflict of 1967, as it had broken Egypt apart from Syria. It could also be argued that the consequences of the two wars did have similarities, as the Israelis remained in an inconclusive conflict with most of the Arab world. The unconventional threats remained substantial due to the Palestinians’ increased reliance on violent resistance. This would result in wars in Lebanon and attacks inside Israel. Nevertheless, these new threats did not undermine Israel\u2019s security nearly as much as the Syrian-Egyptian coalition had before the Israeli military victory ended it in 1973. Therefore, ironically, the war of 1973 had far more conclusive consequences than the conflict of 1967 despite being less of a decisive military victory for the Israelis. <\/p>\n\n\n\n In conclusion, the causes and consequences of the 1973 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars varied. The 1967 war was an unintended escalation of a conflict not intended at the time. Though the Israelis and Arabs may have believed that a military confrontation was inevitable, it had not been part of anyone\u2019s initial short-term strategy in 1967. This is in significant contrast to the war in 1973. The Egyptians had already determined that this would happen, and there was no doubt about its long-term necessity. The consequences of these wars had more extensive variations. The 1967 war had ended with a resounding Israeli victory that confirmed Arab humiliation but failed to neutralise their ability to counterattack eventually. The end of the first conflict essentially made the second clash inevitable. The 1973 war, however, ended in a far more conclusive manner, proving to the Arabs that a military defeat of Israel was not feasible, illustrating to the world the necessity of a diplomatic solution, and pushing the Egyptians to negotiate. Accordingly, the final vestiges of Arab unity disintegrated, opening the space for Israel to enjoy unprecedented regional security but also suffer through increased internal strife as it continued to violently suppress the occupied Palestinian population and deny them a state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Bibliography<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n KAMRAVA, MEHRAN. \u201cThe Arab-Israeli Wars.\u201d In The Modern Middle East, Third Edition: A Political History since the First World War<\/em>, 3rd ed., 108\u201338. University of California Press, 2013<\/p>\n\n\n\n Bregman, Ahron. Israel’s Wars : A History since 1947<\/em>. Florence: Taylor & Francis Group, 2003<\/p>\n\n\n\n Roland Popp. \u201cStumbling Decidedly into the Six-Day War.\u201d Middle East Journal<\/em> 60, no. 2, 2006<\/p>\n\n\n\n Karsh, Efraim. \u201cThe Six-Day War: An Inevitable Conflict.\u201d Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 2017.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nadav Safran, The War and the Future of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Foreign Affairs, 1974<\/p>\n\n\n\n Charles W. Yost, The Arab-Israeli War, Foreign Affairs, 1968<\/p>\n\n\n\n Terrill, W. Andrew. \u201cTHE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR.\u201d ESCALATION AND INTRAWAR DETERRENCE DURING LIMITED WARS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2009.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1]<\/a> Roland Popp. \u201cStumbling Decidedly into the Six-Day War.\u201d Middle East Journal<\/em> 60, no. 2, 2006<\/p>\n\n\n\n [2]<\/a> Terrill, W. Andrew. \u201cTHE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR.\u201d ESCALATION AND INTRAWAR DETERRENCE DURING LIMITED WARS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2009.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n [3]<\/a> Karsh, Efraim. \u201cThe Six-Day War: An Inevitable Conflict.\u201d Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 2017.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n [4]<\/strong><\/em><\/a> KAMRAVA, MEHRAN. \u201cThe Arab-Israeli Wars.\u201d In The Modern Middle East, Third Edition: A Political History since the First World War, 3rd ed., 108\u201338. University of California Press, 2013, p.108<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n [5]<\/strong><\/em><\/a> Ibid, p.117<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n [6]<\/strong><\/em><\/a> Bregman, Ahron. Israel’s Wars : A History since 1947. Florence: Taylor & Francis Group, 2003, p.66<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n [7]<\/strong><\/em><\/a> Ibid<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n [8]<\/strong><\/em><\/a> Roland Popp. \u201cStumbling Decidedly into the Six-Day War.\u201d Middle East Journal 60, no. 2, 2006<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n [9]<\/strong><\/em><\/a> Bregman, Ahron. Israel’s Wars : A History since 1947. Florence: Taylor & Francis Group, 2003<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n [10]<\/a> Charles W. Yost, The Arab-Israeli War, Foreign Affairs, 1968<\/p>\n\n\n\n [11]<\/a> Terrill, W. Andrew. \u201cTHE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR.\u201d ESCALATION AND INTRAWAR DETERRENCE DURING LIMITED WARS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2009.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n [12]<\/a> Bregman, Ahron. Israel’s Wars : A History since 1947<\/em>. Florence: Taylor & Francis Group, 2003, p.108<\/p>\n\n\n\n [13]<\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n\n\n\n [14]<\/a> KAMRAVA, MEHRAN. \u201cThe Arab-Israeli Wars.\u201d In The Modern Middle East, Third Edition: A Political History since the First World War<\/em>, 3rd ed., 108\u201338. University of California Press, 2013, p126<\/p>\n\n\n\n [15]<\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.consecon.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/02\/300px-Egyptianbridge.jpg\")
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