In the two decades between 2000 and 2020, the Islamic Republic of Iran has emerged as a preeminent Middle Eastern power. Though in 2000, the Islamic republics’ power and influence struggled to breach its own borders, by 2020, its influence stretched uninterrupted from Iran’s western hills through Iraq, Syria and Lebanon to brush the Mediterranean coast and the northern edges of the Islamic revolution’s ideological nemesis, Israel. The King of Jordan described this stretch of Iranian power as the “Shia Crescent.”[1]<\/a> The achievement of Iran in forming such a domain should not be understated. At no point were Tehran’s financial or military capabilities superior to its numerous regional foes, at least in any conventional understanding of those terms. On its list of enemies in 2003 was the United States, the undisputed global hegemon; Saudi Arabia, the wealthiest country in the region; and Israel, arguably the region’s foremost Military Power. It was also indirectly opposed by several other states with extensive resources, such as the Gulf states, Turkey and other Arab states such as Jordan and Egypt. Despite this, Iran’s mix of unconventional tactics and bold geopolitical interventions consistently outperformed its stronger foes. By 2020, Iran had strengthened its grip over Lebanon and gained effective control over Iraq, Syria, and much of Yemen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Such successes in Iran’s foreign policy were not without cost. The wars fought in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen against the Saudi, Israeli and Turkish militaries and numerous rebels and militia groups backed by those Powers and the United States demanded much in blood and treasure.[2]<\/a> Moreover, the sanctions imposed on Iran have also been economically damming. However, Tehran\u2019s policymakers, in their various forms and institutions, have repeatedly proven victorious on the battlefield. This has enabled Iran’s influence to impact the entire region, allowing Tehran to play a decisive role in its future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Consequently, it is necessary to comprehend the fundamental rationale that guides Iran’s foreign policy. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Attempting to understand and explain Iran’s foreign and security policymaking is challenging. Iran’s government system is unique in that it comprises conventional centres of power, such as the President and parliament, and Ideological centres, such as the Supreme Leader and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC). Some experts coin this situation as a “dual sovereignty”, illustrating how separate these power centres can be.[3]<\/a> Though the constitution binds these institutions to work together, they often take very different views of Iran’s foreign and security policies. Depending on the domestic political situation, they may exert varying levels of influence on separate areas of Iranian policies at different times.[4]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n However, what is true is that Iran’s Foreign policy regarding the Shia Crescent is ideologically based, with power and security frequently playing secondary roles in the decision-making of the Islamic Republic. This conclusion will be demonstrated by analysing Imam Khomeini\u2019s revolutionary ideology and proving that its significance and influence in the broader state have not been diminished by time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Iran;s ideology<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The revolutionary Ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran was imagined by Ayatollah Khomeini, the principal leader of the Islamic Revolution and the republic thereafter. He was an Iranian Islamic scholar born in 1902. Throughout his life, he would witness several humiliations of his country and faith at the hands of Western powers. These included the invasion of Iran by Britain in 1941, a coup against the democratic government of Mossadegh in 1952, the Western-leaning Shahist Iran which followed, and consistent failures of secular Middle Eastern regimes to resist Western interference.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These humiliations occurred alongside his Islamic education, which started in Qom in Iran and later in Iraq, where he studied after being exiled from Iran in 1964 for supporting protests against the Shah.[5]<\/a> In Iraq, where he studied with other prominent Shia clerics such as Sadr, an increasingly revolutionary interpretation of Shiite Islam’s relationship with politics emerged. Khomani published his refined revolutionary understandings in a book labelled Islamic Government, which laid out his ideological vision. [6]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Imam Khomeini’s ideology contended that Islam should represent a state’s primary governing law. As the clergy were the only men truly qualified to interpret such Islamic guidance, they should oversee state institutions. Moreover, the entire system had to be led by one supreme Islamic jurist who commanded an understanding of Islamic theology and doctrine, enabling a genuinely Islamic administration.[7]<\/a> Accordingly, such a system was known as “Wilayat al Faqhih” or the “Guardianship of the Jurist”. It would represent the base of the Islamic Republic’s governing system once Imam Khomeini seized the state.[8]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n However, Imam Khomeini’s Islamic vision preceded the domestic governing system of Iran. It also advocated a radical international vision. Khomeini’s ideology stressed that the very notion and concepts of modern states and borders were un-Islamic and illegitimate. He believed the Islamic world, the \u201cUmmah\u201d, should constitute one joined entity. Iran represented but the starting line. Imam Khomani stated this in no unclear manner, “we do not recognise Iran as ours, as all Muslim countries are part of us”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In this vision, Imam Khomeini viewed his Islamic jurisdiction as possessing clear foreign enemies. Primary Western countries, and especially the United States, who had, in his view, repeatedly tread over the Islamic world in an effort to subjugate and oppress it. Israel was seen as a direct insertion of Western Power into a central organ of the Islamic world, Jerusalem. Consequently, it represented the crown of the West’s myriad injustices towards the region and Islam. Israel represented the central aim of the Islamic Jurdists’ destructive intentions. Its dissolution would remain the Islamic Republic’s primary but elusive goal and maintain the nation’s focused attention.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Of course, revolutionary ideology is often watered down significantly as the revolutionary state learns to contend with its limited resources and the political environment around it. Iran would seem a likely candidate to maintain this course, considering Khomeini’s ideological enemies included every significant regional power and both global superpowers. Indeed, some tenets of Komeini\u2019s vision were sequestered from Iran’s primary foreign policy, such as efforts to rule over the entire Islamic world or reject the international system and notions of nation-states outright. However, the core of Imam Khomeini’s vision remained the commanding factor in Iran’s policies relating to Islamic governance and resistance to the West, especially Israel.[9]<\/a> Indeed, Iran would continue to pursue Israel’s dissolution for the next four decades.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Takeyh viewed Khomeini\u2019s success in building a system that maintained critical aspects of his ideology as the Ayatollah’s key and success unique from any other 20th<\/sup>-century revolution. He cites that Iran’s political forces have continued to utilise Imam Khomeini\u2019s’ Ideology to legitimise their positions and that Iran’s foreign policy regarding Israel and broader resistance to the West remains faithful to the supreme leader’s original vision. Other scholars frequently supported this understanding. This includes Przemyyslaw Osiiewicz, an expert who specialises in the EU’s policy towards the Middle East, who contended that “The core of the Iranian foreign policy had originally been created on the basis of Khomeini’s concepts”.[10]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Moreover, Mahan Abedin, a British-Iranian expert on the topic with an extensive background in think tanks, also asserts that these aspects of Iran’s ideological zeal regarding Israel had only strengthened since the revolution. The academic evidence consequently backs these notions that Iran’s Ideology has remained in many regards, as dominant as it was under Khomeini\u2019s direct governance, especially regarding Israel.[11]<\/a> Takeyh asserts that Khomeini\u2019s ability to interweave his revolutionary principles into the very social fabric of the Iranian population, along with the extraordinarily dense institutionalisation, was critical to this success.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Conclusion<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n This central notion that critical aspects of Khomeini’s original ideology remain preeminent in Iran’s modern decision-making must be understood. This is vital, as many contemporary critics of the argument that Iran continues to pursue inherently ideological objectives claim that Iran has lost much of its revolutionary principles. They suggest that Tehran only uses its exceptionally anti-Zionist position as a talking point to elicit Arab support or legitimisation for objectives only based on Power or Security. This view is misleading and is countered by a genuine comprehension of the continued significance of Imam Khomeini\u2019s beliefs in Iran today.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1]<\/a> Balanche, Fabrice. 2018. “From the Iranian Corridor to the Shia Crescent.” Hoover Institute, August 17.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [2]<\/a> Sadjadpour, Karim. 2022. “Iran\u2019s Hollow Victory: The High Price of Regional Dominance.” Foreign Affairs, March\/April.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [3]<\/a>Abedin, Mahan. 2018. Iran Resurgent: The Rise and Rise of the Shia State. London: Hurst & Company.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [4]<\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n\n\n\n [5]<\/a> Takeyh, Ray. 2009. Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs. New York: Oxford University Press.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [6]<\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n\n\n\n [7]<\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n\n\n\n [8]<\/a>Ghorayeb, Amal Saad. 2002. Hizbu’llah: Politics and Religion. London: Pluto Press.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [9]<\/a> Takeyh, Ray. 2009. Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs. New York: Oxford University Press.<\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.consecon.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/12\/iran-leaders-street.jpg\")
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