By Shayan Fallahi, December 2023<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The IRGC is an ideological institution that mixes Islam with Iranian nationalism; however, the Islamic aspects reign supreme. In the IRGC, legitimacy is derived from the defence of its ideology, not necessarily Iran, an entity primarily defended by the separate conventional military.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This article will briefly explain the institutional foundation of the IRGC. It is posed only as an introduction to the fascinating depth of Iran\u2019s institutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The IRGC is an institution whose influence is fundamental to the policies of the Islamic Republic and crucial to understanding it. Formed in the early stages of the Iran-Iraq war, its objective was to defend the ideological core of the Islamic Republic and maintain the revolution. It is no small institution. Its militias and regular forces had already rivalled the military capability of the regular army by 1982, and by 1983 it was a tri-force. Its continued existence was not inevitable after the war. Still, after Khomeini died in 1989, Khamenei, his successor, came to rely on it for support. It expanded as a result and became an expansive government organisation larger than several ministries combined with numerous economic and military offices and powers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
To become the dominant force in Iranian foreign policy, several rival organisations had to be co-opted or overcome. Iran’s foreign policy-making institutions are numerous but can be generally divided into four sections. The first is the security services that can manufacture their own policies and then carry them out or influence other institutions to do so on their behalf. These are primarily the Ministry of Security and Intelligence (MOIS) and the Islamic Republic’s Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC). The next is the Supreme Leader and his offices, which make the final decision on all foreign policy actions. The following section comprises educational and research centres, such as state think tanks and universities. The key examples are the Centre for Strategic Research (CSR), the government’s most significant think tank, and the Azad University (AZU), a mass of state-administered universities that educate influential figures and research aspects of foreign affairs. The final section is the democratic and least Islamic institutions most prone to conflicting with the IRCG, represented by the parliament’s Foreign Relations Committee (FRC) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Though the influence of these institutions varies at different times, the IRGC soon became the preeminent force in the realm of foreign policy. The swaths of institutions and political problems within Iran led to extensive factionalism and chaos. The IRGC perceived this to be a threat. Consequently, over the last 20 years, they formed their own alliance, which has come to dominate Iran’s foreign policy establishment at the expense of traditional actors in this sector. To overcome the disquiet of the MFA, the IRGC has come to ally with the MOIS and friendly aspects with the MFA itself along with think tanks such as the CSR, which came under the pro-IRGC leadership of Ali Akbar Velayati in 2019 and had boasted pro IRGC elements previously. This was all underwritten by the crucial alliance the IRGC maintains with the Supreme leader Khamenei. This coalition enabled the IRGC to dominate the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Iran’s premier decision-making institution. Accordingly, the IRGC has been granted free reign over areas of foreign policy It views to be under its jurisdiction. Such was the strength of the IRGC that its most influential commander, General Qasim Soleimani, could state to American officials that “I control the policy for Iran concerning Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, and Afghanistan.”[1]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n This arrangement has led to extensive disagreements with Iran’s conventional Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), especially while it was under the leadership of Javad Zarif between 2013 and 2021. Zarif wished to follow more pragmatic foreign policies, but his abilities were undermined by the weakness of the constitutional powers of the conventional institutions he relied on. The MFA does not play an official role in formulating policies. Its powers were generally only to implement decisions made by SNSC. Moreover, though the President presides over the SNSC, this institution is still dominated by IRGC commanders and other ministers loyal to them. Furthermore, the Supreme Leader must still approve all decisions made by this body, and he has maintained a strong alliance with the IRGC throughout his tenure. This explains the inability of the conventional Iranian institutions to check the Power of the IRGC and illustrates that though the MFA can sometimes craft policies, and the President may influence them, the IRGC remains in control over what policies are implemented in areas it deems most critical.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The dominance of the IRGC over foreign affairs was illustrated by the continual sidestepping of the foreign minister, Javid Zarif, by the IRGC and other institutional rivals. In 2019, neither Zarif nor his ministry was informed of Syrian President Assad’s visit to Iran, causing him to attempt to resign. In 2021, he claimed that the IRGC had more control over foreign affairs than the MFA and that he enjoyed “zero” influence.[2]<\/a> He also stated that while at a meeting of the SNSC, he was commanded by the IRCG to deny the accidental downing of a passenger plane in 2020. Mehrzad Boroujerdi even suggested that the MOIS had upped its detention of dual nationals specifically to undermine the MFA’s diplomatic efforts with the West. He stated that the MFA’s “institutional rivals have no qualms about leaving the drudgery of consular affairs and public diplomacy to the foreign ministry, as long as the ministry’s leaders understand that they need to bend the knee on certain weighty issues pertaining to national security.”[3]<\/a> Consequently, though Iran boasts dual ideological and conventional centres of power, the Islamic-based IRGC dominates the spectrum. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [1]<\/a> Boroujerdi, Mehrzad. 2019. “Javad Zarif Returns\u2014to a Foreign Ministry Still Out in the Cold: Iran\u2019s Top Diplomat Vies for Authority.” Foreign Affairs, March 6.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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